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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W. M. BARNES COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SOHIO NATURAL RESOURCES 
COMPANY, a Corporation, formerly 
SOHIO PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
Case No. 16454 
In its initial brief, plaintiff-appellant ("Barnes") 
argued that the district court erred in refusing to consider 
parol evidence on the question of whether the transaction taken 
as a whole involved a deed which was intended to create a 
security interest. Defendant-respondent ( "Sohio"), al though 
admitting that parol evidence may and should be considered on 
such a question as a general rule, countered by stating that 
such a question does "not require such a factual inquiry where, 
as in the present case, the deed is accompanied by contempora-
neous writings exhibiting the intentions of the parties." 
(Sohio Brief, p. 23) 
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Barnes' 
Sohio also argued that "even assuming the truth 
extrinsic factual assertions, there still is no genui:· 
issue and the case was properly decided as a matter of law.· 
(Sohio Brief, p. 27) 
In reply, Barnes argues here that: 
1) Contemporaneous writings accompanying a deed ar: 
not conclusive of the issue of the parties' intent 
ing the deed and do not bar consideration of parol 
i 
in exchan( I 
evidence o·'. 
that issue; I 
! 
2) 
deed in this 
The contemporaneous writings that accompanied thel 
I 
case are, in any event, ambiguous and the cour: 
must thus consider parol evidence in construing them; 
3) The record evidence reveals numerous materia:: 
issues of fact that need to be further discovered and tried o: 1 
remand, including, inter alia, issues relating to outrageous 
and manipulative conduct designed to deprive the appellant oi 
his property at a fraction of its worth. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Contemporaneous Writings Accompanying a 
Deed Are Not Conclusive on the Issue of 
Whether a Deed Was Intended to Create a 
Security Interest and Do Not Bar 
Consideration of Parol Evidence on that 
Is sue. 
· d 1 · d i· n th i· s case, By refusing to cons1 er paro ev1 ence 
. n 
the court below ignored the universally acknowledged exceptio 
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to the parol evidence rule that a party may show by "parol 
evidence" that "a deed absolute on its face . [was] given 
for security purposes only." Bybee v. Stuart, 189 P. 2d ll8, 
122 (Utah 194 8). Sohio seeks to rationalize the court's error 
by arguing that where a deed is "accompanied by contemporaneous 
writings exhibiting the intentions of the parties," the 
except ion does not apply. (Sohio's Brief, p. 23) This is not 
the law in Utah, however. 
In Utah a court charged with determining whether a 
deed was intended as a mortgage must examine al 1 of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the transact ion. As this Court 
stated in Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940 (Utah 1933): 
"As the equity, upon which the court acts in such 
cases, arises from the real character of the 
transaction, any evidence, written or oral, 
tending to show this is admissible." 
Id. 15 946, quoting Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332 (1877). See 
also Duerden v. Solomon, 94 P. 978 (Utah 1908); Thomas v. Ogden 
State Bank, 13 P.2d 636 (Utah 1932). 
Sohio's citation of Brown v. Skeen, 58 P.2d 24 (Utah 
1936) and Gibbons v. Gibbons, 133 P.2d 105 (Utah 1943) to the 
contrary is unavailing. Both cases are inapposite. In neither 
of them was the trial court asked to consider any evidence 
besides the written instruments. Indeed, in Gibbons, supra at 
106, the court expressly states that "[n]o evidence was taken 
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on the question except the written agreement pleaded 
1 
admitted and its construction was submitted to the court ai 
matter of law."!/ 
Among the facts and circumstances which must 1., 
considered in determining whether a deed was intended as 
mortgage are: 
Whether or not there was a continuing obligation 
on the pa rt of the grant or to pay the debt or 
meet the obligation which it is claimed the deed 
was made to secure; the question of rehtive 
values; the contemporaneous and subsequent acts; 
the declarations and admissions of the parti.es; 
the form of the writ ten evidences of the transac-
t ions; the nature and character of the testimony 
relied upon; the various business, social, or 
other relationship of the parties: and the 
apparent aims and purposes to be accomplished. 
Corey v. Roberts, supra at 942. As Barnes will demonstrate 
the succeeding sections of this memorandum, evidence on each 
these facts and circumstances that tended to show the "rn,, 
character" of the transaction was presented to the cou:·. 1, 
below. Nonetheless, the court 
instead solely on the writings 
mine the intent of the parties. 
refused to consider it, relyini 
accompanying the deed to deter\ 
This was reversible error. B'\ 
!lone Utah case, Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.!: 
636 (Utah 1932), not cited by Sohi.o for the proposition, see~: 
to suggest by way of dicta that writings accomp~nying a de: 
would be conclusive on the issue of intent. It is not cle3:· 
however, that any parol evidence was offered to the court 11' 
that case. 
-4-
I 
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relying solely on the writings, the court denied Barnes its 
chance to show the "real character of the transaction," as is 
its right in th i s type of case . As the California Supreme 
Court stated in an en bane decision, Beeler v. American Trust 
co., 147 P.Zd 583, 595 (Cal. 1944), relying solely on the 
accompanying writings to determine the parties' intent is no 
better than relying on the deed itself: 
If by a separate writing the parties expressly 
agree, at the same time an absolute deed is 
executed, that it is what it purports to be, that 
is, an absolute sale, that would be no more than 
what the deed itself says. Therefore, if they 
could thus avoid its real effect as a mortgage, 
the true nature of such a transaction could never 
be shown. 
See also Larson v. Hinds, 394 P. Zd 129 (Colo. 1964); Deardorff 
v. Nielson, 438 P.Zd 981 (Or. 1968). Contra: see cases 
collected at 111 A.L.R. 448. Accordingly, this case should be 
remanded so the lower court can hear and consider al 1 of the 
evidence relevant to the parties' intent. 
II. The Contemporaneous Writings that 
Accompanied the Conveyance and Assign-
ment Are Ambiguous and Parol Evidence 
Must Be Considered to Construe the 
Transaction. 
Even if a court as a general rule may rely solely on 
the writings accompanying a deed to determine whether it was 
intended as a mortgage, it may not do so where the intent as 
expressed in the documents is ambiguous. As this Court stated 
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i n Han sen v . Ko h 1 e r , 5 5 0 P 2 d 1 8 6 , 1 8 8 ( U t ah 1 9 7 6 ) , who· 
"ambiguities are injected into the transaction" by the "sub,. 
quent agreements", a "more searching look into the evidence" 
1 I 
necessary. 
The documents which accompanied the deed in this 
i.e. the Letter of Commitment (R:79), the Conveyancear 
Assignment (R: 85), the Escrow Agreement ( R: 89) and t 
Promissory Note (R:93) -- are blatantly ambiguous and the cour 
below erred in not considering parol evidence to resolve ti,· 
ambiguities. 
A. The Letter of Commitment and the Escrow Agreement 
Chronologically, the first of the "contemporaneou' 
writings" executed by the parties was the October 7, 19' 
"Letter of Commitment". This letter, on Sohio's letterheaa. 
was prepared by Sohio' s lawyers during a meeting at Sohio'• 
corporate offices in Cleveland at which Mr. Pfortzheime 
(Sohio' s Vice President) and Mr. Barnes (who was withou 
counsel) were also present. The letter was signed by Barne 
and Sohio prior to the time, later in the same day, that th 
participants went to Sohio's Bank where Mr. Barnes was sho• 
for the first time 
Agreement. (R:42:69) 
the Promissory Note and the Escro 
The Letter of Commitment contains n 
mention of the Promissory Note, the Conveyance and Assignmen 
or the Escrow Agreement. 
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The Letter of Commitment first states that the 
"consideration" Sohio commits to pay for the "purchase" is 
$500,000, conditioned upon Barnes electing to sell at that 
price and giving Sohio not less than sixty days notice of such 
election. On page 2, however, Sohio agrees, upon the exercise 
of its "preferential right to purchase," to pay whatever a 
third party offeror shall offer to Barnes for the property at 
any time up to December 31, 1972. Sohio claims that under 
Paragragh 2 of the Escrow Agreement, Barnes made an "election" 
to effect a sale to Sohio on December ~. 1972 at the $500,000 
price by failing to pay the Bank loan on that date. However, 
Sohio concedes it received notification from Barnes on December 
~. 1972 (R: 120-121) that Barnes had an offer from Prudential 
Drilling Funds, Inc. to purchase the property at a price of 
$2, 500, 000 plus a royalty of 1/ 6 or $. 60 per barrel, whichever 
is greater, which Barnes had elected to accept subject to first 
offering Sohio the right to purchase at that price. The 
"election" Sohio claims Barnes impliedly made under Paragraph 2 
of the Escrow Agreement is sharply at variance, by millions of 
dollars, with the express election Barnes actually made, on the 
same day, pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Commitment. 
The ambiguity in the two instruments sets up the trap which 
Sohio seized upon to claim that it could acquire the property 
at a ridiculously low price merely by refusing to tell Barnes 
-7-
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whether it would meet he Prudential offer until i after .i 
December 2 9. 1972, 
·1 
note payment date would have passed. 1! 
'I 
Letter of Commitment gives Barn t · 1 D b 31 ' es un i ecem er _, l9i1 '.. 
notify Sohio of any bonafide offer from a third party t 
purchase its property and Sohio then has thirty days to deci:, 
whether to match the offer and to exercise its preferentia 
right to purchase. Under Paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreeme~t. 
however, as the Court below read it, Barnes, in direct contra 
diction of the Letter, only has, in effect, until November 1!, 
1972 to communicate a thirty-party offer to Sohio. If it wait 
any longer and Sohio takes a full thirty days to decide whethe· 
to exercise its preferential purchase right, Barnes will 
deemed to have "elected" to sell Sohio, even while it is await· 
ing Sohio' s reply to its notice of having elected to accept tn: 
third party offer, unless it can pay the bank by December 29. 
The unfairness of this is augmented by the fact tha1 
the Letter of Commitment states nothing about a default o; 
Barnes' loan from the Bank being deemed to be an "election" t 
sell and specifically provides that any sale by Barnes is too 
at Barnes' election upon sixty days' written notice to Sohio 
By its own terms, the Escrow Agreement, which was prepared 0 
Sohio and the Bank and signed on October 7, 1971, several hour 
after the Letter of Commitment was signed was set up 
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to provide for a deposit in escrow of the instru-
ment of conveyance to be used in the event of the 
purchase by [Sohio] of the properties of [Barnes] 
pursuant to the Letter of Commitment. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
In spite of the express language, the Escrow Agreement then 
sets forth in Paragraph 2 a method of purchase not even 
referred to in, and inconsistent with, the methods outlined in 
the Letter of Commitment. 
Thus, without the Letter of Cammi tment, the Escrow 
Agreement is meaningless, since it purports to effect a sale 
"pursuant" to the Letter. Together, the two instruments are at 
best, ambiguous, and the more reasonable construction of the 
instruments is as explained by Mr. Barnes, viz.: that the 
$500,000 figure on page one was inserted to establish for the 
Bank that the property being mortgaged was worth at least the 
-
amount of the loan (since Sohio was willing to stand behind the 
loan in that amount with the property as security); that the 
consideration Sohio received for assisting Barnes to obtain the 
loan was the first refusal option to meet the price of a third-
party offeror; that the Conveyance and Assignment was merely 
-9-
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security for the loan naming Sohio the gr anteeY 
I 
as in t ~,I 
event it paid the loan for Barnes' account; that the Escro.
1 
Agreement was merely the vehicle to accomplish the secure,1 
'I 
transaction and was to have no operative effect itself and that: 
upon Barnes' failure to pay the Bank Sohio would wind up ai 
Barnes' secured creditor. (R:42:30-43) 
Besides being inconsistent with the Letter oi 
Commitment, Paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreement is inconsistent 
with other provisions in the Escrow Agreement itself. As notei 
above, the escrow was established as a deposit for the 
Conveyance and Assignment which was "to be used in the event ol 
a purchase pursuant to the Letter of Commitment." In 
addition, Paragraph 3 of the Escrow Agreement states that the 
bank shall release the Assignment and Conveyance only "in the 
event (Sohio] becomes obligated under the said Letter of 
Commitment." (Emphasis supplied.) The purchase that was 
.Yin its Brief, Sohio points to the fact that th1 
Conveyance and Assignment did not name the Bank but rathei 
Sohio, as grantee as evidence that it was not i~tended as 1 
mortgage. (Sohio Brief, p. 19) Tli.is is entirely consisten: 
with Mr. Barnes' explanation of the transaction. Although thi 
Bank was the initial lender, it expected Sohio to purchase th: 
loan if Barnes defaulted and to then assign the note to Sahli 
and deliver the note to it with its accompanying secunt' 
instrument (the Conveyance and Assignment). It was therefori 
important that Sohio, as the party who might ultimatelv bi 
required to foreclose the mortgage, be named as grantee. 
-10-
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allegedly made in accordance with Paragraph 2 was plainly not 
"pursuant" to the Letter of ·commitment nor had Sohio become 
obligated "under" the Letter of Commitment as a result of 
Barnes' default on the loan. Thus, the subsequent delivery by 
the bank to Sohio of the Conveyance and Assignment appears to 
have been in violation of the express escrow instructions. 
A further internal inconsistency in the Escrow 
Agreement is found in comparing Paragraph 4 with Paragraph 2. 
Under Paragraph 4, the Bank is empowered to accelerate the 
maturity of the note if Barnes at any time prior to December 
29, 1972, should sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the 
property "in whole or in part". Paragraph 4 further provides 
that if Barnes fails to pay the note upon such acceleration, 
Sohio will pay it upon demand by the Bank. Thus, under 
Paragraph 4, Barnes could sell all or part of the property 
(after obtaining Sohio' s waiver of its first refusal option) 
and default on its payment of the note but be deemed under 
Paragraph 2, by reason of such default, to have "sold" the 
property to Sohio. 
B. The Promissory Note. 
The Bank's handling of the Promissory Note made by 
Barnes is consistent with Barnes' explanation of the transac-
tion and reveals that the parties intended a secured loan and 
not a sale. When Barnes defaulted on the note on December 29, 
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1972, the Bank demanded payment from Sohio, wh · h · 
1 c l t made 
(R:43:0-8, 96-97) However, instead of markincr the note ---'""-2----=..-..:..::::...::_~~ 
full, cancelling it and returning it to Barnes, as it wouJ: 
have done if payment had been intended as consummation of 
purchase of the land, the bank assigned the note, withOU' 
recourse, to Sohio (R:94), thus in legal effect making Barnii 
Sohio's debtor. 
This act by the bank, as evidenced by the writing 01 
the note itself, is plainly inconsistent with the interpreta· 
tion given to the escrow documents by Sohio, which is predi· 
cated on the fact that there never has been and is not now an1 
indebtedness between Sohio and Barnes. (Sohio Brief, p. 18] 
In fact, Sohio has been since January 1973, the 
Barnes' negotiable note, with full power to further 
to a bona fide purchaser, during which time, it 
holder oi 
endorse it I 
has never 
attempted to return the note to Barnes. Under the lower 
court's ruling, Barnes is in the position of having "sold" for 
$500, 000, a property worth many mi 11 ions and st i 11 having been, 
for the past seven years, at risk on the negotiable paper whicn 
allegedly constituted the "purchase price." The manner ir: 
which the Bank and Sohio have treated this note shows clearlr 
that the transaction was intended to be as Barnes has alwav< 
maitained, viz., that Sohio has purchased secured .E_'.lper, not 
the property. 
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The court below, although aware of the assignment of 
the note to Sohio, nevertheless ruled that 
the escrow documents, and in particular the 
letter commitment to purchase would not as a 
matter of law permit an interpretation of the 
transaction as a security transaction contemplat-
ing foreclosure, rather than one of purchase as 
is expressly provided in the instrument. (R:l52) 
Faced with the blatant inconsistency between its interpretation 
of the Letter of Commitment and the Escrow Agreement and the 
Bank's act in assigning the note to Sohio, the court had no 
choice under the law but to consider parol evidence in an 
ff t 1 h . . 3/ e or to reso ve t e inconsistency.-
I I I. There Are Material Issues of 
This Case Which Will Require 
Discovery and Trial on Remand. 
Fact in 
Further 
As its second argument in support of the lower court's 
decision, Sohio contends that "even assuming the truth of 
Barnes' extrinsic factual assertions, there is still no genuine 
issue of materal fact and the case was properly decided as a 
matter of law." (Sohio Brief, p. 26-27) Even the most cursory 
.~/Sohio asserts that if tl-te transaction was a mort-
gage with Sohio becoming the holder of the note by assignment, 
as Barnes claims, "Barnes could be expected to complete the 
sale to Prudential and pay off the note or redeem ~he prope~ty, 
as the case may be." (Sohio Brief, p. 16) This convenient 
speculation by Sohio ignores the fact, asserted by Mr. Barnes 
(Barnes Deposition, R:42:71) that Prudential refused to .go 
forward with the purchase in face of Sohio' s adverse claims 
against the property. 
-13-
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review of the record reveals, however, that the only way Sohic 
can make such an argument is by resolving every factual dispute 
raised by "Barnes' extrinsic factual assertions" in its Oiir, 
favor. On Summary Judgment, however, as Sohio admits elsewhere. 
in its brief, just the opposite resolution of factual disputes 
is required. (Sohio Brief, p. 9) As this Court stated in 
Larsen v. Ch r i st ens en , 4 4 3 P . 2 d 4 0 2 , 4 0 3 ( Utah 1 9 6 8) , on 
summary judgment "the evidence and every reasonable 
inference that could be drawn therefrom [must be] considered in 
the light most favorable to 'the party against whom summary 
judgment is sought."' When the evidence in this case is viewed 
"in the light most favorable" to Barnes, there can be no 
question that the case must be remanded for trial. Every major 
fact cited by Sohio as necessary to a judgment in its favor as 
a matter of law, as well as many others, is disputed by Barnes' 
record evidence. 
A. The Issue of Indebtedness. 
Probably the key issue in determining whether a trans-
action was intended as a mortgage is the question of whether 
there is any existing indebtedness between the parties to the 
transaction. Sohio asserts in its brief that "Barnes has never 
even claimed any indebtedness between it and Sohio." (Sohio 
Brief, p. 20) It can do so only be wilfully ignoring the 
evidence in the record. 
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Mr. Barnes testified at his deposition that Barnes 
considers itself in debt to Sohio for $500,000 plus interest 
(R:42:71) and that it has carried such a debt on its books 
since January, 1973. (R:42:74) Moreover, the note given 
originally by Barnes to the bank as evidence of the debt has 
not been cancelled. Instead, upon Sohio's payment of the note, 
the bank, consistent with Barnes' testimony about its indebte-
dness to Sohio, assigned the note to Sohio. (R:93-94) 
Although Sohio cites evidence that apparently contradicts 
Barnes' claim of indebtedness, that only serves to prove that 
the issue of indebtedness is one of fact which needs to be 
tried on remand. 
B. The Issue of the Value of the Property. 
One of the factors "often stated to be the single most 
important" one in determining whether a deed was intended as a 
mortgage, Kjar v. Brimley, 497 P.2d 23 (1972), quoting from 
Rizo v. Macbeth, 398 P. 2d 209 (Alaska 1965), is the "smallness 
of the sum owed in comparison with the value of the land 
interest conveyed." 3 Powell on Real Property, 594-98 ( 1977). 
There is evidence in the record that the value of the land 
conveyed here was many times the $500,000 Barnes claims it owes 
Sohio. Sohio' s evidence to the contrary only proves, as with 
the issue of indebtedness, that the value of the property is a 
material fact that needs to be tried. 
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At his deposition, Mr. Barnes testified: 
Of course, I had no intention of 
property for five hundred thousand. 
going to sell the property, I would 
much more than that. I had offers 
for much more. 
selling the 
If I was 
sell it for 
outstanding 
(R:42:31) In addition, Barnes alleged in its complaint (R:1) 
and Mr. Barnes testified in his deposition (R:42:55) that 
Prudential Fund, Inc. offered to purchase Barnes' interest in 
the Asphalt Ridge Properties for $500,000 cash, a five year 
promissory note in the amount of $2,000,000.00 bearing interest 
at 6 9,, 
. '
and a leaseback of the properties to one of Barnes' 
subsidiaries subject only to a one-sixth royalty or 60i per 
barrel of oil produced, whichever was greater. 
By itself, this disparity between what the property is 
worth and what Barnes claims it owes justifies a remand of this 
case. Summary judgment is not appropriate where t11e result 
would be the forfeiture of property worth millions of dollars 
by reason of a ·default on a loan worth a fraction of that 
amount. Faced with such an apparently unjust result, a court 
of equity should consider every shred of evidence, parol or 
otherwise, before enforcing the transaction. 
c. The Issue of Barnes' Understanding of ~ 
Transaction. 
By taking it out of context, Sohio attempts to make 
much out of Mr. Barnes' statement in his deposition that he 1 
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"knew what [he was] signing. " (Sohio Brief, p. 15) That 
statement, however, refers only to the Letter of Commitment. 
About the Escrow Agreement, which, as discussed above, is 
inconsistent with the Letter of Commitment and set up the trap 
in which Barnes was ultimately caught, Mr. Barnes had this to 
say: 
A. The letter from Sohio, that was the 
agreement between the parties. [The Escrow 
Agreement] was merely, as l have signed many 
loans at banks, you have to sign whatever 
the fine print is whether you like it or 
not .. 
Q. Now you are not making any claim here today 
that there is anything in the escrow agree-
ment marked D- 3 that was not in accordance 
with your agreement with all the parties at 
the time? 
A. At the time and the way they explained it 
and l quickly scanned it, I thought it was 
all in accordance with the first agreement. 
The only thing that l should have objected 
to that was a little out of line, and then 
again we were, we felt we were good friends 
with Sohio and had been working with them 
for, five or seven years or something. When 
the bank got through the fine print l didn't 
notice it until I read it here a year later 
carefully. There is one conflicting 
paragraph in it to a degree. Or the two 
documents. And as the first document says, 
I know we discussed it considerably. l 
think we changed the terminology to satisfy 
me ·in the first one. Was that the pledge of 
the collteral was only a pledge of the 
collateral. And not a sale of the asset. 
Only if I in writing demanded it. They 
slipped in this fine print on me that as of 
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a certain time 
them to do 
understanding. 
they assume that I 
it, which was 
am asking 
not my 
Q. Now I am not sure. You made a couple of 
statements about fine print. As you look 
over Exhibit 0-3 is there any fine print, or 
is that all a typed document? 
A. It's typed, but I'll find the paragraph 
maybe that covers this that I have referred 
to. 
Q. The print is all the same is it not? 
A. Poor selection of terminology. In exact 
contradiction to the document signed in the 
mor[n]ing by the parties, this one reads as 
I did not catch is what I am referring to, 
that it shall be deemed that borrower has 
elected to sell to offerer. That was never 
my understanding. I didn't realize that 
when I executed the agreement. 
(R:42:35-37) 
At the very least, this testimony raises a factua 
question as to "the way [Sohio] explained" the Escrow Agreemer 
to Barnes and as to whether the parties ever discussed ti 
contradiction between the Letter of Commitment and the Escr1 
Agreement. 
D. The Issue of the Parties' Subsequent Acts. 
Sohio argues that Barnes' acts subsequent to ti 
transaction at issue in this case tend to confirm that 
transaction was a sale rather than a mortgage. (Sohio Brie 
p. 15-18) This would only be true if Mr. Barnes' testimo 
about what he did on behalf of his company subsequent to t 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
transaction and why he did it is disregarded completely. While 
Sohio claims that Barnes "ignored" the property, Mr. Barnes in 
fact testified that he had "tried to keep abreast" of the 
developments on the land, that he had "periodically" visited 
it, and that the only reason Barnes did not pay its share of 
the expenses of the land is that Sohio did not bill it for the 
expenses as it had promised to do under the October 6, 1971 
operating agreement. (R:42:81-84) Furthermore, while Sohio 
claims that Barnes "made no objection or contrary claim for 
five years prior to this lawsuit" with respect to Sohio's 
ownership of the land, the record reveals that Barnes on advice 
of counsel believed that the letters exchanged with Sohio in 
January, 1973 had put Sohio on notice of its claim and that no 
further action was necessary until Sohio took steps to fore-
close on the property. (R:42:62-64; 73) Consistent with its 
belief, as soon as Sohio contacted Barnes in 1977 to have 
Barnes acknowledge the Conveyance and Assignment, 
brought this suit. 
Barnes 
Moreover, Sohio fails to mention in its brief that 
under the operating agreement (R:70), Barnes' lack of involve-
ment in the day-to-day management of the property was to be 
expected. Under the agreement, Barnes had turned over to Sohio 
the "sole control, custody, supervision and management of the 
properties" and had given to Sohio authority to "conduct all 
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matters of a routine nature affecting the Properties, or the 
Parties, as such, in the ordinary course of business. 
Thus, it is plain that Sohio' s assertion that Barnes "ignored" 
the property and failed to put Sohio on notice of its claim is 
directly disputed by the record evidence. 
Also in dispute is the significance of Sohio's subse-
quent acts. Sohio claims that its acts were "fully consistent" 
with ownership. (Sohio Brief, p. 16) Many of those same acts, 
however, i.e., managing and developing the property a~ 
paying the taxes and other assessed expenses on it - - were also 
fully consistent with Sohio' s trustee status as the record 
title holder and with its responsibility under the operating 
agreement to control, supervise and manage the property. 
Moreover, Sohio' s failure to attempt to have the Conveyance and 
Assignment acknowledged until 1977 (Sohio Brief, p. 8) also 
suggests that it was acting pursuant to the operating agreement 
rather than an absolute conveyance. As Barnes is entitled to 
the inference that these acts were taken pursuant to the 
operating agreement, there is plainly a genuine issue of fact 
about their significance that precludes summary judgment at 
this point in the case. 
E. The Issue of Fiduciary Duty. 
"In determining whether a deed, absolute in its terms, 
is intended as a mortgage, [one] of the essential elements to 
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be considered" is the "various business, social, or other 
relationships of the parties. " Corey v. Roberts, 25 
P.Zd 940, 942-943 (Utah 1933). There is evidence here that the 
relationship of Sohio to Barnes with respect to the Asphalt 
Ridge Properties was that of a trustee, thus giving rise to 
certain fiduciary duties on the part of Sohio. The operating 
agreement recites that Sohio is "holding" the property for 
Barnes (R:70). Sohio itself states in its Commitment Letter to 
Barnes that the property is "currently held in Sohio' s name as 
trustee for Barnes" (R: 79) and the Conveyance and Assignment 
drafted by Sohio states that "the record title to [the 
property] is now held in the name of [Sohio] for the use and 
benefit of [Barnes]." (R: 85) Certainly, Barnes believed that 
Sohio owed it certain fiduciary duties. (R:42:84-85) 
Although Sohio cites evidence to the contrary, that 
simply demonstrates, as noted above with respect to the other 
issues, that the issue of whether Sohio owed Barnes any 
fiduciary duties, what those duties were and how the trustee/ 
beneficiary relationship may have affected the negotiations 
between Barnes, Sohio and the bank is disputed and needs to be 
tried on remand. 
The lower court, in its Original Ruling, held that no 
breach of "any fiduciary responsibility" of Sohio to Barnes 
could be inferred from the transaction because the October 6, 
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1971 Operating Agreement "authorized the parties to increase 0, 
decrease their respective interest" in the property. 
This conclusion does not follow from the premise. 
that parties to a joint venture agree that they may 
( R: 14 5 I 
The fact 
... increase 
or decrease" their respective interests does not mean that the·: 
can do it in an unconscionable manner. Their conduct towards 
each other remains open to challenge, particularly where, as 
here, one (Sohio) stands in the relationship of trustee for the 
others (or at least, for Barnes). The lower court surely haa 
no basis for concluding, as a matter of law, that no breach of 
fiduciary duty had occurred in this case. The record is 
replete with facts from which it can be inferred that sue\ 
breach occurred in a most flagrant fashion. At the very least, 
Barnes is entitled to a full hearing on this issue. 
F. The Issue of a Provision for Redemption. 
Sohio claims that the "absence of any right of redemp· 
tion by Barnes" on the face of the documents evidencing the 
transaction establishes "as a matter of law that the transac· 
tion between the parties was not a mortgage." ( Sohio Brief, 
I 
p. 20) This argument is beside the point. The issue here is I 
not whether 
sites of a 
the Conveyance and Assignment 
5/ formal mortgage,- but whether 
has all the requi· 1 
it was intended as 
~/Even if this were the issue, Utah law does not 
provision for require a mortgage to have an explicit 
redemption. See U.C.A. §57-1-14. 
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a mortgage. If it was, then "equity will give effect to the 
intention of the parties," Bybee v. Stuart, 189 P.2d ll8, 122 
(Utah 1948), by implying the right of redemption inherent in 
all mortgages. 
Gibbons v. Gibbons, 139 P.2d 105 (Utah 1943), which 
Sohio cites in support of its proposition, is distinguishable. 
There the court's task was simply to determine without refer-
ence to any parol evidence whether a deed and an accompanying 
writing contained on their face the requisites of a formal 
mortgage at law. Noting, among other things, that the docu-
ments contained no provision for redemption, the court quite 
properly held that they were not a mortgage. 
Moreover, it appears from the record in this case that 
one reason why there is no provision for redemption on the face 
of the documents is because Sohio and the bank contrived to 
have Barnes waive the right at the time the loan was made. 
Barnes came to Sohio needing money, explaining that it 
had not sought a loan from its regular bank because it needed 
to deal with someone who knew the true value of the property. 
(R:42:28) Sohio said that it was not in the business of 
lending money, but that it could probably arrange a loan to 
Barnes from its regular bank. (R:42:29-30) Rather than have 
Barnes pledge the property directly to the bank as security for 
the loan, which Barnes wanted to do (R:42:27-28), Sohio 
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negotiated with Barnes the agreement embodied in the Letter of 
Commitment. In that letter, Sohio promised to buy the property 
for $500,000 at Barnes' election in return for a grant bv 
Barnes to Sohio of a first right of refusal on the property, 
With the letter in hand, Barnes and Sohio then went to the b~ 
where the Escrow Agreement was signed. That Agreement, con· 
trary to the Letter of Commitment, as discussed above, provided 
that Barnes would be deemed to have elected to sell to Sohio if 
it defaulted on the loan to the bank on or before December 29, 
1972. 
As a consequence of these agreements, the bank's loan 
to Barnes was secured, not by the property directly, but 
through the commitment of its good customer, Sohio, to purchase 
the property for the amount of the loan in the event of a 
-
default and to pay the proceeds to the bank. (Sohio Brief, 
p. 20) The bank thus had the advantages of a security interest 
in the property without the disadvantages of havi~ ~ 
foreclose on that interest to realize its benefits. Sohio, on 
the other hand, with no risk to itself, stood to acquire the 
property in the event of a default for a fraction of its value, 
also without having to foreclose. Barnes, who needed the moneY 
and Sohio' s assistance in getting it and so was willing to 
h 1 f · h hi· s r i· ght of . agree to t e arrangement, was e t wit out 
redemption. 
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Had Barnes been dealing solely with the bank, such an 
arrangement would have been void as against public policy. See 
Kawauchi v. Tabata, 413 P.2d 221 (Haw. 1966); Coursey v. 
Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1967); 59 C.J.S. §818. Public 
policy is no less offended, however, when the same result is 
achieved by the involvement of a third party closely associated 
with the bank. The debtor is still forced to waive in advance 
his right of redemption in order to get a loan. Yet Sohio now 
has the temerity to argue that because the provision of redemp-
tion which it contrived to have Barnes waive is missing, there 
is no mortgage. 
G. The Issue of Laches. 
Sohio argues the applicability of the doctrine of 
laches. (Sohio Brief, p. 21) In so doing, Sohio relies upon 
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), where an opera-
tive fact was that the plaintiffs in that case did not believe 
they owned the property in question. Barnes' testimony is to 
the contrary. In any event, the elements of laches -- i.e., 
whether Barnes sat on its rights and why, and the extent to 
which delay in bringing the suit may have prejudiced Sohio 
are inherently questions of fact not appropriate for resolution 
of summary judgment. In any event, as discussed above, those 
facts are disputed in the record. 
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CONCLUSION 
I 
The court erred in not considering parol evidence onl 
the parties' intent. Had it considered the parol evidence, itl 
would have determined that many material issues of fact are: 
disputed in this case, thus making summary judgment i nappro-
priate. Accordingly, the Court should vacate the judgment of 
the lower court and remand this case for a full trial of all 
issues. 
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